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NOTES
THE EFFECT OF THE I9IO AMENDMENT OF THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE ACT ON THE LIABILITY OF TELEGRAPH COMPANIES;-

The state courts of this country early recognized the telegraph.
company as a public service corporation. As a consequence of
this, when the telegraph companies sought to limit their liability
for errors arising from the negligence of their operators, by printing on the back of their blanks a series of rules which were to
govern the contract between them and their patrons, a large
number of the courts were quick to declare some of these stipulations void as against public policy. One of these -conditions
which the telegraph companies sought to impose on the public,
and which a great majority of the state courts held to be an unfair
imposition, was the restriction of their liability in the case of the
unrepeated message to the amount paid for the- sending of it.
(2s9)
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The courts of last resort in the following states have held that
such a stipulation is no bar to a recovery of full damages for negligence by the company in the handling of an unrepeated message:
Alabama,1 Arkansas, s Florida, 3 Idaho, 4 Illinois,r Indiana, 6 Kentucky,7 Maine, 8 Mississippi,g Missouri,10 Nebraska, 1 North Carolina, Oklahoma,"3 South Carolina,* Texas,16 Utah, 8 West Virginia,7 and Wisconsin.', Among the arguments advanced to
support these decisions are: that the telegraph company owes a
duty to supply adequate facilities to the public at a reasonable
rate, and that it is unconscionable to compel the public to pay
an additional charge to insure itself against the negligence of the
company; that the burden of proof should rest on the company
to produce facts to excuse its mistake rather than on the individual
to show negligence on the part of the company, since the facts
involved are peculiarly within the knowledge of the company;
and that, since the transaction of modern business makes the use
of the telegraph essential to the individual, his acceptance of
such a condition by making use of the company's blank is in effect
moral duress.
On the other hand, the "unrepeated message" stipulation has
been consistently held to be reasonable by the federal courts.
The leading case on this point in the United States Supreme Court
is Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph Co.19 The court here
concludes that such a stipulation was not one exempting the company from liability for its negligence, but was merely a reasonable
condition appropriately adjusting the charge for the service rendered to the duty and responsibility exacted for its performance.
A few of the state courts have followed the federal view and have
allowed this conditional limiting of liability, except in cases of
gross negligence or wilful misconduct on the part of the company.
' Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chamblee, 122 Ala. 428, 25 So. 332 (1899).
2Western Union Tel. Co. v. Alford, ixo Ark. 379, z61 S. W. 1027 (1913).
3 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Milton, 53 Fla. 484, 43 So. 495 (1907).
45 Strong v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 Idaho 389, io8 Pac. 91o (191o).
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Tyler, 74 Ill.
168 (1874).
76Western Union Tel. Co. v. Todd, 22 Ind. App. 701, 53 N. E. 194 (1899).
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Eubank, 15o Ky. 59! (1912).
8Haskell v. Postal Tel. Co., 114 Me. 277 (1915).
9Postal Tel. Co. v. Wells, 82 Miss. 733, 35 SO. 190 (1903).
10Reed v. Western Union Tel. Co., 135 Mo. 661 (1896).
" Am. Express Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 97 Neb. 701, 151 N. W. 240 (1915).
"Williamson v. Postal Tel. Co., 1i N. C. 223, 65 S. E. 974 (19o).
18Blackwell Milling Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 17 Okl. 376 (19o7).
14Walker ir. Western Union Tel. Co., 75 S.C. 512 (1906).
15 Postal Tel. Co. v. Sunset Construction Co., 1o2 Tex. 148, 114 S.W. 98
(19o8).
16Brooks v. Western Union Tel. Co., 26 Utah 147 (1903).
7 Beatty Lumber Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 52 W. Va. 410 (1903).
U Fox v. Postal Tel. Co., 138 Wis. 648 (igog).
19154 U. S. i (1893).
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2
This view has also obtained in24California,20 Georgia,
1 Massa22 Michigan,2' New York, and Rhode Island.25
chusetts,

Such was the state of the law when the Interstate Commerce ActG was amended in 191o,27 so as to extend the power of
rate regulation in respect to interstate business to include telegraph, telephone, and cable companies in addition to railroads,
already granted in the original act. Section i of the amended
act provided inter alia that "messages by telegraph, or cable,
subject to the provisions of this act, may be classified into day,
night, repeated, unrepeated, letter, commercial, press, government, and such other classes as are just and reasonable, and different rates may be charged for the different classes of messages."
But the amendment failed to make any mention of the liability
of these companies for negligence in respect to their interstate
business.
The question immediately arose in the courts of those states
which had advocated unrestricted liability in the sending of unrepeated messages, whether, .in the case of interstate messages,
they should continue to apply their own law, or whether, by the
passage of the amended act, Congress had "occupied the field"'' i
as to the companies' liability on interstate messages so that they
were bound to apply the federal law on the subject as laid down
in the Primrose case. 29 The question resolved itself into whether
the classification provided for in Section I,by specifically including
repeated and unrepeated messages and "such other classes as are
just and reasonable" and thus recognizing that the telegraph companies' conditions as to unrepeated messages were reasonable,
did not impliedly put the determination of the reasonableness of
these rules beyond the power of the state courts. On the other
hand, it was argued that a previous amendment s0 had been deemed
necessary by Congress to take over the field of liability of interstate carriers of goods, whereas the rate regulation of such carriers
had been taken over in the original act; and therefore, by analogy,
Congress had not intended to vest the Interstate Commerce Commission with exclusive powers as to liability in respect to interstate telegraph messages.
In a recent Illinois case, 3' decided on October 27, 1919, the
supreme court of that state took the view that the Amendment
of I9io did not occupy the field of liability in such cases so as to
0Cot v. Western Union Tel. Co., 130 Cal. 657 (1900).
SWestern Union Tel. Co. v. Waxelbaum, 113 Ga. 1017 (1901).

4Wheelock v. Postal Tel. Co., 197 Mass. 119, 83 N. E. V3 (1G8).
2"Jacob v. Western Union Tel. Co, 135 Mich. 6S.(19o4).
Wov.
Postal Tel. Co., ig4 N. Y. 88 (1910).
25M. M. Stone and Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., (191o) 76 AtI. (R. L.) 762.
"6Act Feb. 4, x887, c. 104, 24 Stat. .379.
27 AtJune 18, 1910, 36 Stat. 539, c. 309.
"8N. Y. C. R. R. v. Board of Freeholders, 227 U. S. 248 (4913).
"9154 U. S. 1 (1893).
"0Act June 29, 19o6, c. .3591, 7, 34 Stat. 595, U. S. Comp. Stat. 8604a.

31Bowman &-Bull Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 124 N. E. 851 (Ill. i919).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

262

preclude the states from applying their own law to the subject.
The court, citing Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Hughes,32 pointed
out that the highest court of a state may administer the common
law according to its understanding and interpretation without
being subject to review in the federal Supreme Court, unless some
right, title, immunity, or privilege, created by the federal power,
has been asserted and denied; and that, by the holding in the
Hughes case, state courts continued to be allowed to apply their
own interpretation of the common law as to the liability of carriers,
in the interim between the original rate-regulating act and the
passage of the amendment (Carmack Amendment of 19o6), which
specifically provided for federal determination of such carriers'
liability. Although since the amendment this decision is inapplicable to carriers, said the court in advancing the argument
set down in the latter part of the previous paragraph, it is entirely
in point in the case of telegraph companies. Also, reasoned the
court, the distinction between repeated and unrepeated messages
was one made by the companies prior to the amendment of 191o,
even in those states where there was unlimited liability on both
classes of messages; and, hence, if Congress had intended to transfer jurisdiction over the liability of the companies to federal tribunals, it would have done so in clear and unmistakable language,
instead of depending on a mere classification of the various forms
of messages to imply this intention.
Applying much the same reasoning, the appellate courts of
three other states, Arkansas,33 Mississippi, 4 and Texas,3 5 have
decided in accord with the view taken in the Illinois case. Curiously enough, in order to reach this conclusion, the supreme courts
of both Arkansas and Mississippi had to overrule their own defrankly admit that they
cisions of but a year or two previous, and
3
had misinterpreted the act of Congress. 6
But the majority of adjudicated cases in both- the state and
lower federal courts have held to the contrary. Such are decisions
in Alabama,3 7 Georgia,18 Kansas, 39 Kentucky,40 Maine," Massachusetts,- Oklahoma, 4 Pennsylvania, 4 South Carolina, 5 TenR. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477 (1903).
Des Arc Oil Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 201 S. W. 273 (Ark. 1918).
Dickerson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 114 Miss. 115, 74 So. 779 (1917).
:5
36 Bailey v. Western Union Tel. Co., io8 Tex. 427, I96 S. W. 516 (1917).
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Holder, 117 Ark. 210, 174 S. W. 552 (1915);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Showers, 112 Miss. 411 (1916).
37Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hawkins, 14 Ala. App. 295 (1915).
38
Western Union Tel. CO. v. Petteway, 21 Ga. App. 725, 94 S. E. 1032
2 P.
33

34

(1918).

340Kirsch v. Postal Tel. Co., ioo Kan. 250, 164 Pac. 267 (1917).
Merriweather v. Western Union Tel. Co., 183 Ky. 710, 210 S. W. 190

(1919).
41Haskell Implement Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 114 Me. 277 (1915).
4 2

Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, 224 Mass. 365 (1916).
43Western Union Tel. Co. v. Bank of Spencer, 53 Old. 398, 156 Pac. 1175

(x916)44

(915).

Straus Gas Iron Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 59 Pa. Super. Ct. 122

45 Hartness v. Western Union Tel. Co., 99 S. E. 759 (S. C. 1919).
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nessee, 41 Virginia, 47 Wisconsin, 48 and also in the Court of Appeals
for the District of Colunbia1 9 the Interstate Commerce Commission,51 and the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit. 51
The matter is, however, settled once and for all by a decision
just handed down (December 8, I919) by the Supreme Court
of the United States in the case of Postal-Telegraph-CableCo. v.
Warren-Godwin Lumber Co.6 2 In this case the Supreme Court,
in interpreting the Amendment of I9io, held, in accord with the
majority of the state courts, that the act did vest with the federal
courts the exclusive power to determine a telegraph company's
liability on unrepeated interstate messages; and, furthermore,
applying the federal interpretation of the common law, as laid
down in the Primrose case, as to the company's right to restrict
its liability in such messages, it reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of Mississippi in favor of the Lumber Company. Mr.
Chief Justice White, in writing the opinion of the court, based his
construction of the Amendment on three grounds. The first
reason advanced by the chief justice is, that it is apparent on the
face of the Act of I9IO that it was intended to control telegraph
companies by the Act to Regulate Commerce; it is clear that the
Act of i9io was intended to and did subject telegraph companies
in respect to their interstate business to a rule of uniformity of
rates which it was the purpose of the Act to Regulate Commerce
to establish. This purpose would be destroyed if the companies
continued to remain subject to conflicting local laws. Secondly,
since the Act empowered telegraph companies to fix reasonable
interstate rates, it empowered them to fix a rate for the unrepeated
telegram; and, citing the Primrose case, this power carried with
it the right to fix a reasonable limitation of responsibility. In his
third reason, Chief Justice White points to the express classification in Section i of the Act, and adds: "From the very inception
of the telegraph business, or at least for a period of forty years
before i91o, the unrepeated message was one sent under a limited
rate and subject to a limited responsibility of the character of
the one here in contest." The argument of the chief justice would
seem to be that, because of the length of time of the existence of
the unrepeated message, Congress must be held to have understood that the express granting of the power to contract for such
messages carried with it, by implication, the power to limit liability in respect to them.
Irrespective of the merits of the question as to whether or
not it is good public policy to allow a public servant like the teleWestern Union Tel. Co. v. Schade, i37 Tenn. 214 (1916).
Boyce v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 Va. 14, 89 S. E. io6
48 Durre v. Western Tel. Co., 165 Wis. 190 (I917).
46

(1916).
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Dant, 42 App. D. C. 398 (1914).
50 Produce Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 44 Int. Com. Rep. 670 (1917).
51Gardiner v. Western Union Tel. Co., 231 Fed. 405 (1916).

47

49

52-U. S.--(19 9).
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graph company to limit its liability in this manner, it is apparent
that the Supreme Court's decision in this important case settles
a troublesome question in a manner which conduces to harmony
and which will prevent a considerable amount of uncertain litigation on this subject in the future.
C. W.B.T.
UPoN WHom SHOULD THE BuRDEN FALL TO ESTABLISH THE
VALIDITY OF AN ALTERATION IN AN INSTRtTMENT?-The

over-

whelming weight of authority supports the view that a certificate
of deposit in the ordinary form is negotiable and is, both in substance and legal effect, a promissory note, and to be governed by
the rules that apply thereto.' In Forrest v. Safety Banking Trust
Co.,2 a certificate of deposit in the regular bank form was held
to be a negotiable instrument within the provisions of the Pennsylvania Negotiable Instruments Law of 1901. In such a negotiable instrument a material alteration by the payee or transferee
8
is a good defense, except as against a holder in due course. And
it cannot be questioned that an alteration which changes the
amount of the note or other written instrument, is a material one,
6
both at common law4 and under the Negotiable Instruments Law.
But it surely would seem that if such a material alteration is
apparent on the face of the document, one who takes such an
instrument cannot be considered a holder in due course under that
section of the Negotiable Instruments Law -which provides that,
"A holder in due course is a holder who has taken an instrument
which is complete and regular on its face." 6 This view is strongly
emphasized in three recent cases 7 in which the preceding section
of the N. I. L. was cited and it was held that one who took an
instrument with an alteration plainly apparent on its face, could
not be considered the taker of an instrument which was complete
and regular on its face. In another case the same section was
cited but was not made the basis of a similar result8
' Miller v. Austen, 54 U. S. 218 (1851); First National Bank v. Stapf,
c65 Ind. 162, 74 N. E. 987 (7905); Hanna v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 104 App.
Div. N. Y. 90, 93 N. Y. S. 304 (i9oS); Lamar Drug Co. v. National Bank of
Albany, 127 Ga. 448, 56 S. E. 486 (19o6); Kavanaugh v. Bank of America, 239
Ill. 404, 88 N. E. 171 (19o9); Kushner v. Abbott, 156 Iowa 598, 137 N. W. 913
(1912).

2 174 Fed. 345 (7909).

3Sec. 124b. "But where an instrument has been materially altered and
is in the hands of a holder in due course, not a party to the alteration, he may
enforce payment thereof according to its original tenor." 4 Cape Ann National Bank v. Burns, r2 Mass. 596 (188o); Fordyce v.
Kosmininski, 49 Ark. 40 (1886); Burrows v. Klink, 70 Md. 451, 17 Atd. 378
(7889); Heard v. Tappan, ix6 Ga. 930, 43 S. E. 375 (7902).
What constitutes a material alteration? "Any alteration
6 Sec. 125.
which . . . changes the sum payable either for principal or interest."

6Sec. 52.

(1).

7Eisv. Whitney, So Misc. N. Y. 326, 98 N. Y. S. 667 (19o6); Pensacola
Bank v. Melton, 270o Fed. 57 (19713); Farmers State Bank v. West, 77 Ore. 602,
152 Pac. 238 (1915).
8 Harrison v. Pearcey, 174 Ky. 485, 192 S. W. 513 (r917).
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The great difficulty however is under sub-division a of see.
of the N. I. L., 9 where the plaintiff is not a holder in due course,
for the authorities are in irreconcilable conflict as regards the
time when an alteration apparent on the face of the instrument
was made. Must the holder establish the validity of the alteration in the instrument upon which he wishes to recover, or must
the one who alleges that the instrument has been fraudulently
changed, offer proof to that effect? The cases on the subject fall
within two classes. The first class leaves the burden of proof
upon the proponent where tradition has placed it, while the second
class changes the burden of proof and places it on him who denies
the validity of the instrument. While this change is sometimes
effected directly by a judicial or statutory declaration, 10 the same
result is often reached by some so-called presumptions, operating
until the contrary appears by a preponderance of the evidence.
The American Courts are here following their usual practice in
discussing this question in terms of presumptions, but there are
no presumptions based on probability plus the difficulty of proof.
As Mitchell, J., points out in Wilson v. Hayes,- the mere fact of
an alteration creates no predominance of probability as to the
time when it was made, either before or after execution. The
appearance of the document, the similarity or difference in the
handwriting or ink, or other peculiarity in the handwriting, and
the nature of the subject matter of the alteration might raise
inferences one way or the other; but such appearance and subject
matter are of such infinite variety, that no general presumptions
of this sort could properly exist. Whatever presumptions there
are owe their recognition to the desire of the court to throw the
burden of proof upon the holder, even though the traditional
theory was to the effect that a document to be valid must be fair
and perfect on its face. That an alteration should not of itself
invalidate an instrument, was therefore a mitigation of the strictness of the earlier law; but for a time, even an immaterial alteration was fatal unless made before execution. Even after it became
settled law that only an immaterial alteration had no invalidating
effect on an instrument, the traditional view remained strong
enough to regard a material alteration as prima facie destructive.
of the force of the instrument, and to require him who alleged that
he fell within the newer mitigating exception to prove the facts
which brought his case within it. When the land-owning aris124

9 "Where a negotiable instrument is materially altered without the assent
of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided, except as against a party who has
himself made, authorized, or assented to the alteration and subsequent indorsers."
1
0Wheat v. Arnold, 36 Ga. 479 (1867). Under the Georgia Code, an
alteration only invalidates a note or other written instrument if made intentionally by a party claiming under it, in a material part and with intent to defraud. Clear and satisfactory proof is required so that all notion of any fraudulent intent is rebutted.
1"40 Minn. 531, 42 N. W. 467 (1889).
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tocracy of England, politically dominant, became conscious of
the danger to their titles lurking in this doctrine, the courts,
themselves springing from the aristocracy, or looking forward
to forming a family which would be a part of it, and so desiring
to give stability to titles depending on ancient deeds and other
manuscripts, were naturally anxious to give prima facie validity
to even obviously altered instruments. But the traditional theory
had to be overcome before titles could be protected from destruction through the carelessness or laziness of some scrivener, long
dead and .gone. Courts are naturally, and perhaps properly,
adverse to an open rupture with tradition; but the object was
obtained by one of those presumptions which have little relation
to the probative value of the data, but which require the assumption of some fact until its non-existence is established, because
the court desires to settle such cases as though the fact existed.
Such presumptions express no principle common to the whole law
of proof; but as a practical matter they do change the law in the
particular field in which they operate. And this was more obvious
while parties were incompetent as witnesses, and particularly
where, by lapse of time, or because the transaction was of such a
type, that the parties were usually the only participants. In
such cases a presumption changing the burden of proof was, in
practical effect, often of as much actual effect as one which precluded proof to the contrary. To change the burden of proof as
to the date of an alteration, so as to require the maker to invalidate
the instrument by showing that the alteration was subsequent
to the execution, instead of requiring the holder to prove that it
was made prior to it, where the mouths of both were closed, left
the question to be decided upon the nature of the alteration.
There are a considerable number of jurisdictionss which
place the burden of proof upon the person alleging the alterations,
to show not only the fact of alteration, but also that it is such an
alteration as invalidates the instrument. Some courts account
for this by a presumption against fraud and in favor of innocence.
One cannot but feel that this so-called presumption of innocence
is used to justify a change in the law of contracts, which concerns
written instruments and their alteration. It enables the courts
to give effect to their convictions that a writing should not be
vitiated by an alteration, unless it is shown to have been subsequent to its execution. The formalistic conception of, a solemn
deed, that it was only valid if perfect, is much like the old idea of
the destruction of the priestly office by the mutiliation of the
incumbent. This sort of presumption, like so many artificial
2Doe dem. Titmouse v. Aubrey, reported in Samuel Warren's "Ten
Thousand a Year."
13 Cochran v. Nebeker et al., 48 Ind. 459 (1874); Wilson v. Hayes, 40
Minn. 531, 42 N. W. 467 (1889); Franklin v. Baker, 48 Ohio St. 296, 27 N. E
550 (1 89); Portsmouth Savings Bank v. Wilson, S. App. D. C. 8 (1894); Richard.
son v. Feilner, 9 Okla.513, 6o Pac. 270 (i9oo).

NOTES

presumptions, serves, like a legal fiction and a conclusive presumption of law to which it closely approximates the purpose of conforming a new theory to an old practice, or a new practice to an
old theory, without a definite break with tradition; and thus it
changes the law.
A recent New Mexico decision's refused to adopt any of the
so-called presumptions and held that the question was one solely
for the jury. However, it put on the defendant, the maker, the
burden of going forward with the evidence, relative to his allegation that the alteration was made after execution. Probably
the majority of the cases hold, in close conformity with the older
concept, that the burden of explaining an alteration rests on him
who relies on the instrument. 15 This rule which requires explanatory proof by the party producing it, certainly cannot be criticized
as unfair or as contrary to any legal principle. For, as was well
said by Turnbull, J.,16 "Written instruments are supposed to be
the repositories of the intentions of the parties, but they would
surely be very unsafe repositories of such intentions, if the party
having possession of an instrument was at liberty to alter it at
his pleasure, and then call upon the other party to show that the
alteration was made after execution, or else be bound by its contents." Suppose that a note has been altered after its execution,
how can the maker show that fact? It would seem more reasonable to require the holder of an instrument which has been altered
to explain the alteration, than to require the maker, who probably
has not seen the note since its execution, to show that the alteration has been made since that date. Otherwise the maker must
take evidence of the appearance of the note when it was delivered
14

Luna v. Montoya, 184 Pac. 533 (New Mexico, i919). The instrument
was a book entry, which the trial court considered as a certificate of deposit,
and ruled: r. That the rights and liabilities of the parties were to be governed
by the same principles of law as are applicable to bank certificates of deposit.
2. That the alteration of the amount in the instrument was so apparent as not
to be suspicious. 3. That no presumption either way arose in respict to such
an alteration. 4. That although the question was one for the jury to decide
in respect to when the alteration was made, the defendant, the maker, had the
burden of proof in showing that the instrument was altered after execution.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed these four rulings.
25 Knight v. Clemens, 7 L. J. Q. B. N. S. i44 (Eng., 1838); Wheat v. Arnold,
36 Ga. 479 (1867); Slater v. Moore, 86 Va. 26, 9 S. E. 419 (1889), "Every alteration on the face of a written instrument detracts from its credit and makes it
suspicious, and the party claiming under it is ordinarily bound to remove this
suspicion"; Est. of Nagle, 134 Pa. 31, i9 Atl. 434 (i8go); Ehrenkrook v. Webber,
ioo Mich. 314, 58 N. W. 665 (1894). Under the N. I. L. the burden is on the
holder, Elias v. Whitney, supra. In Eng. the rule applies to all commercial
paper because of the requirements of the Stamp Act, which provides that all
bills and notes must be stamped before they can be used as evidence, and that
if a bill is altered after it issues, no matter by whom, it becomes another bill and
requires a new stamp. Therefore one who offers an altered instrument in evidence must show that the alteration was made before the instrument was complete.
"6Walters v. Short, io Ill. 252 (1848).
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in order to protect himself against subsequent alterations made
without his consent. It certainly would be easier for one who
takes an instrument, to have an alteration or an interlineation
noted, either in an attestation clause or in a marginal note, than
to require the maker to prove that the alteration was made after
he signed it. So, too, a forger in order to meet with a fair chance
of success, need only make a bold alteration in the instrument,
and then take it into court; and unless the maker could satisfy
the jury that the note had been changed since it had left his hands,
the verdict would be in the forger's favor. Even in those cases
where none of the so-called presumptions are indulged in as to
who and at what time the alteration was made, but the question
is considered as one for the jury, the .holder is required to explain
And
the alterations for the jury's benefit and satisfaction.
unless he satisfies that burden by a preponderance of the evidence,
he fails.
The Pennsylvania rule as expressed in Colonial Trust Co. v.
Getz's appears to be, that if the instrument clearly shows upon its
face that it has been altered as to some material part, it is incumbent upon the party claiming under it to remove the suspicion
which attaches, and to account for the alteration. Until this is
done the note cannot be admitted in evidence. But if there is
doubt as to whether there is in fact an alteration, the jury may
receive the instrument and pass upon this question first. If they
find that there has been an alteration, then, unless the one who
offers the instrument proves that it was alfered before or at the
time of its execution, the jury must disregard the instrument
entirely. A Florida caseig with a similar problem in regard to a
the same way upon the
bill of exchange, was decided exactly
20
authority of an old English case.
Those courts which follow the view that the burden is on the
maker to prove a subsequent alteration, do so with the proviso
that this only applies until an inspection of the document shows a
suspicious alteration and the cases are handled somewhat like
those cases where, although the burden of proof of contributory
negligence is on the defendant, the plaintiff may be non-suited
if, in telling how he was injured, he kills his own case by showing
that he was in fact guilty of contributory negligence. For if the
holder, in introducing the instrument, raises any suspicion against
1 Vaughan v. Fowler, 14 S. C. 355 (i88o); Croswell v. Labree, 8I Me. 44,
I6 Atl. 331 (I888); Maguire v. Eichmeier, 1O9 Iowa 3o, 80 N. W. 395 (1899);
Merritt v. Boyden, 191 Ili. 136, 60 N. E. 907 (190).
The defendant as payee of a note was
13 28 Pa. Super. Ct. 619 (1905).
sued on his indorsement by the Trust Co. Defendant's counsel objected to the
note being put in evidence because of two alterations which he claimed were
apparent on the face of the note, one in respect to the original date, the other
as regards the due date. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania considered the
alterations in question as not apparent but merely suspicious.
19Harris v. The Bank of Jacksonville, 22 Fla. 5O, i So. 140 (1886).
20
Desbrow v. Weatherly, 6 Car & P. 758 (Eng., 1834).
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himself, he must remove it. A loose use of the word presumption
occurs in respect to what is called a suspicious alteration. So
long as the parties were incompetent to testify, the only evidence
usually available was intrinsic to the instrument. If the proponent had the burden of proof, it is clear that if on inspection
the alteration was in his handwriting, and was favorable to him,
or if an erasure was of a clause in the interest of the maker, he
has not produced sufficient evidence to justify a jury in finding
that the preponderance of probability was that the alteration
was prior to execution.' So far as it goes, the probative force ot
the data known to the jury is to the contrary. If then the proponent has no other evidence to produce, he has failed to validate
the altered instrument. It seems quite clear that the fact of an
erasure, an interlineation, a change, a correction, the filling in of
a blank, or the fact that the sentence written is longer than the
space allotted to it, and therefore is written on a slant or extends
into the margin, is not so probative of an alteration, either before
or after execution, as to serve as the basis of a presumption of
the sort which operates to relieve a party from showing the existence of what is normally implied from the data known to the
court and jury. The probative value of the erasure, etc., depends
on the circumstances; and with the growing prevalence of prepared
and written forms to fit the average case, which require a certain
amount of erasure and interpolation to suit the occasion, the
hurry and rush of modern business, which precludes the re-writing
of documents containing errors, the notorious inaccuracy in both
mechanical and human typewriters who have now taken the place
of the long ago extinct race of careful draughtsmen, the mere
presence of a change in the written matter of an instrument may
as well be the correction of a mistake as a subsequent change.
Neither the holder nor the maker, in general, has any greater
power than the other to prove an alteration. And even though
both parties could testify, yet the nature of the alteration was
often the only means of proof; and therefore, though there might
have been ground for creating a presumption based on the general
difficulty of proving a legally important and constantly recurring
fact, yet such difficulty of proof is not sufficient. The data must
be such that the fact assumed is one which is the normal inference
therefrom. Here the data is of an infinite variety, both in itself
and in its probative value in connection with such intrinsic facts
as are usually provable; and there is no experience to show that
it is so usual for a particular change to be made before or after
execution, that the contrary is abnormal.
J.H. C.
CANCELLATION OF DEEDS EXECUTED UNDER INFLUENCE OF

THRATs OF CRUMNAL PROSECUTIoN.-The term duress combines
the idea of involuntary action with that of unfair advantage taken
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by the oppressor; and in this latter respect it bears close analogy
to fraud. Originally only such force would be considered duress
as would be sufficient to overcome the will of a courageous man;'
later the test of a person of ordinary firmness was applied;2 but
now the age, sex, state of health, and mental characteristics of
the oppressed person are considered.3 There must be an unlawful
force, 4 and it must be applied by the person taking advantage
thereof;' or if not applied by him, it must be with his knowledge
or for his benefit. 6 It is held that one profiting by duress applied
on his behalf adopts the means in adopting the end.7
Threats, in order to be considered as constituting duress,
must be threats of some unlawful act toward a person or his near
relative. The courts have always taken the humane attitude
that one is affected by a threat directed against a member of one's
immediate family, in the same manner as if it were directed against
one's self. Formerly duress could only be found in four classes of
threats: (i) "For Fear of Loss of Life; (2) Of Loss of Member;
(3) Of Mayhem; (4) Of Imprisonment."8 There are cases which
adopt the rule that threats of criminal prosecution would or would
not be duress depending upon whether the prosecution were illegal
or not, 9 thus allowing the sufficiency of the fear of prosecution,
but not considering it an unlawful force when there is a just cause
for prosecuting. But the best and almost universal rule now is
that fear of prosecution is duress in cases in which an innocent
person is moved to pay money, execute a deed, or give security
under threats of prosecuting a close relative, such as a son, 0 a
husband,' a brother,12 a nephew, 3 or a son-in-law, 14 although the
relative be justly amenable to the prosecution.
This change in the doctrine concerning threats of prosecution
is explained by our higher conception of the right to institute
criminal proceedings. In the early English law it was a personal
right of revenge and satisfaction, and, in many cases, the only
method of obtaining restitution. But now the prosecution is to
avenge the Commonwealth and to prevent a recurrence of the
offense; and to employ it for personal ends is an unlawful abuse of
process.
I Galusha v. Sherman, 1O5 Wisc. 263, 81 N. W. 495 (9 oo ) gives account
of the2historical development.
U. S. Banking Co. v. Veale, 84 Kan. 385, 114 Pac. 229 (1911).
3 Cribbs v. Sowle, 87 Mich. 340, 49 N. W. 587 (1891).
4 Stouffer v. Latshaw, 2 Watts 165 (Pa. 7834).
58 Girty v. Standard Oil Co. i App. Div. N. Y. 224 (1896).
Frederick v. Copeland, i8 Md. 3o6"(1892); Hughie v. Hammett, o5
Ga. 369, 31 S. E. io9 (E898).
7 M~chant v. Cook, 21 D. C. 145 (1892).
8 Bacon's Abridgement, Vol. 2, p. 156, referring to Coke, 2 Inst. 482.
9 Gregor v. Hyde, 62 Fed. 107 (1894).
10 Ball v. Ward, 76 N. J. Eq. 8, 74 Atl. I58 (i9o9).
n Rostad v. Thorsen, 83 Ore. 489, 163 Pac. 423 (1917).
2
1 Schultz v. Catlin, 78 Wis. 61I, 47 N. W. 946 (7897).
13 Sharon v. Geiger, 46 Conn. 789 (1878.
14
Fountain v. Bigham, 235 Pa. 35, 84 AtI. 131 (1912).
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However, this extension of the doctrine of duress by threats
has an important limitation. The law will permit one who has
suffered by a wrongful act, which has a criminal and civil aspect,
to recover a civil satisfaction from the guilty person himself; and
the latter cannot have a just restitution set aside because it was
made under the influence of threats of the legal process to which
he is amenable. 15 It may be said that it is not an abuse of process
to institute criminal prosecution for the purpose of obtaining just
restitution, or perhaps better, that it is the policy of the law to
restrict the doctrine of threats of prosecution to innocent persons
on whom no civil liability rests. On this reasoning, an innocent
person who is accused in good faith of a crime such as embezzlement, should be allowed to recover a supposed restitution made
under threats of prosecution.16 But where the person is guilty,
there must be at least a warrant of arrest, and, according to some
cases, abuse of imprisonment in order to constitute duress. 7 Mere
threats of prosecution against the guilty person constitute duress
in cases in which the crime is purely of a public nature without
any attendant civil liability, or the debt for which restitution
is made does not arise from the offense for which prosecution is
threatened.'8
In the recent case of Savannah Bank v. A11, 19 A executed a
deed to her son B, in order to enable him to execute a mortgage
to the bank to cover an indebtedness of her other son C, incurred
by obtaining money under false pretenses. A remained in possession of the property; and after the mortgage was foreclosed,
and the property was bought by the bank, and the statutory period
during which the son could have been prosecuted had run, she
petitioned to have the deed and mortgage cancelled. A's motive
in executing the deed was to protect her son from prosecution;
and this was known to the bank, although the bank's agent at
the transaction expressly disclaimed any concern with the criminal
side of the matter.
The District Court 20 found no evidence of duress; but, because
the deed was given to stifle a criminal prosecution, and possession
had been retained by A, it decreed cancellation on the ground that
it was an illegal contract.
The Circuit Court reversed the decision because the consideration was simply to settle the civil liability; the motive of
the mother to prevent prosecution did not make the transaction
15 Compton v. Bunker Hill Bank, 96 Ill. 3oI (188o); Thorn v. Pinkham,
84 Me. ior, 24 Atl. 718 (i8gi).
26 See Morse v. Woodworth, 155 Mass. 233, 27 N. E. ioio (I891) and
Kronmeyer
v. Buck, 258 Ill. 586, ioi N. E. 935 (1913).
7
1

Shaw v. Spooner, 9 N. H. I97 (1838); Holbrook v. Cooper, 44 Mich.

373 (188o).

18Thompson v. Niggley, 53 Kan. 664, 35 Pac.

Peden, 274 Ill. 301 (1915).
19260 Fed. 370 (1919).
20250

Fed.

120 (1918).
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272

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

illegal; and even if the transaction had been illegal, because compounding a felony, the parties were in pari delicto and the contract
was executed, and therefore equity could not interfere. The court
then reasons that a suit for cancellation of a deed executed under
duress is one for relief on the ground of fraud, which is barred by
the code in six years from the discovery of the fraud; and in this
case the discovery of the fraud was at the time of executing the
deed since all the facts were known then; and, as more than six
years had elapsed since that time, the action was barred. Finally,
the mother was guilty of laches in waiting until the mortgage was
foreclosed.
In finding no duress it is questionable whether the courts
are not adhering to the language used rather than the idea conveyed.2
In the leading English case of Williams v. Bayleyp a
sensible view was taken. A son had obtained credit from a bank on
forged notes. The father agreed to secure the bank against loss.
There was no promise not to prosecute nor any direct threat of
prosecution, although mention was made of the gravity of the
offense. The Court granted a decree declaring the agreement
invalid and ordering it cancelled, as the father was swayed by the
fear of his son being prosecuted, and the object of the agreement
was to stifle a criminal prosecution.
In its reasoning that, even had there been a promise not to
prosecute, relief could not be given, because the parties would be
in pari delicto, the court in the principal case draws a distinction
between a promise not to prosecute and a threat to prosecute,
which seems to be verbal rather than logical. It seems that each
should carry the same mental stimulus of hope and fear moving
the mother to act in order to save her son from prosecution.
As a matter of code interpretation, it is not clear that the
period of limitations applying to fraud should apply in this case
from the time of signing the deed. If the facts were known at
that time, there was no fraud, and in attempting to make the
analogy between duress and fraud an identity, the court shows their
difference.
The last reason given by the Court against cancelling the
deed, is laches. Had there been such duress at first as to justify
cancelling the deed, it would not seem equitable to find the mother
guilty of laches in not having it cancelled during the continuation
of the original condition. If the fear of prosecution had been
21In Foley v. Green, 14 R. I. 618, i Eastern 40 (1885) the facts were similar
to those of the principal case and the note and mortgage were annulled. "It
is true there was no direct threat by Hanley, but there was a pressure exerted
which had the effect and was doubtless intended to have the effect of a threat."
In Jones v. Merionethshire Building Society, 65 L. T. R., N. S. 685 (i89I) the
Court of Appeal found an implied promise not to prosecute but did not find an
implied threat. See also Ellyson v. Schooler, 149 Iowa 332, 128 N. W. 55i
(igio). Here an implied promise was found to make the notes invalid. The
question of duress was not discussed, as it was not necessary in the determination
of the case.
2 L. R. i Eng. & Irish Appeals 200 (i866)-
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sufficient to deprive her of her free will in executing the deed, it
might also be sufficient to prevent her attempting to cancel it so
long as her son's debt to the bank was unsatisfied and he remained
liable to criminal prosecution. 23 Furthermore, the position of the
lower court seems reasonable, that the failure of the mother to
intervene in the foreclosure proceedings would not operate as a
bar, since the proceedings were against the son and the mother
had not been made a party defendant.
J. B. G., 2nd.
CONTRACTS ILLEGAL BY STATTE.-The question whether a
transaction comes within the prohibition of a statute would appear,
at first thought, to be purely one of construction. The inquiry
that naturally suggests itself in every case in which the legality
of a contract, involving some act or transaction within the purview of a prohibitory or penal statute, is in question, is: Does the
Act forbid the contract? It is obvious that the solution of the
problem represented by the question may involve two distinct
lines of inquiry. The purpose of one is to determine the legislative
intent, in respect of the effect of the statute on contracts founded
upon or growing out of a violation of the act. On the other hand,
in those cases where the contract is not directly founded upon a
violation or evasion of the statute, either in its consideration or
immediate purpose, and involves only indirectly a breach of the
law, a second inquiry may be necessary to determine whether it
may not, in spite of the remoteness of the connection, be affected
by the illegality."
The various rules adopted by the courts, purporting to be
rules of construction, have tended to become crystallized to such
an extent that they serve in many instances to control, rather than
interpret, the legislative intent. It is a rule universally accepted
that, if a statute renders a contract illegal, such a contract, if
made, is wholly void and cannot be enforced; but there is considerable difference of method in determining what contracts are
made unlawful by legislative enactment. A majority of the courts
have adhered to the rule that each statute must be construed with
reference to its language, subject matter, the wrong or evil which'
it seeks to remedy or prevent, and the purpose sought to be accomplished by its enactment.2 The object of the construction in such
cases is to determine the intention of the legislature as to tha
legality of the contract itself, considered as a subject matter of
legislative intent, distinct and apart from the transaction which
forms the consideration of the contract and which is the immediate
2

3 Allen v. Leflore County, 78 Miss. 671, 29 So. i6i (igoo); Wilsonv. Calhoun, 1170 Iowa III, 151 N. W. io87 (1915).
See Toler v. Armstrong, 4 Wash. C. C. Rep. 297 (1822).
2
Bowditch v. Ins. Co.- IVi Mass. 292, 4 N. E. 798 (1886); Pangborne v.
Westlake, 36 Iowa 546 (1873).
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subject matter of the legislation. Where the courts have adopted
this rule the fact that the act is prohibited, and thereby made
illegal, is not of itself considered sufficient evidence of an intention
on the part of the legislature to declare illegal and void all contracts in relation thereto. It is merely one of a chain of circumstances to be taken into consideration. 3 In some of the cases, it
is said that a prohibition or a penalty gives rise to a presumption
that the intent of the legislature was that all contracts in relation
thereto should themselves be illegal and void. But this presumption of illegality is said by the same cases to be only operative
where there is nothing in the context of the statute from which
an intent one way or the other could be inferred; and where there
are present the other factors, 4 usually taken into consideration,
the presumption is inoperative.
The Pennsylvania courts have rigidly adhered to a quite
different rule, viz., that whenever an act is prohibited, any contract founded upon or in furtherance of the prohibited act is conclusively held to be illegal and void;5 and, where a statute requires
that certain acts shall be done or that they shall be done in a particular way, a failure to comply with the requirements of the
statute is equivalent to a violation of a prohibition.6 While the

courts of Pennsylvania, in accord with others, have stated repeatedly that a penalty implies a prohibition,7 yet it would seem
that where a statute contains no prohibition other than such an
implied one, contracts affected thereby are not declared to be
illegal with the same unfaltering rigidity as those which come within
the operation of a true prohibitory enactment, and that the court,
in such cases will consider the entire statute for the purpose of
ascertaining the legislative intent. It has accordingly been held
that a statute, providing that certain requirements should be

complied with by all persons engaged in a certain business and
making the omission to comply a misdemeanor, did not render
acts in conducting the business unlawful, although they might

render the person liable to the penalty.8 It would therefore seem
3The Oneida Bank v. The Ontario Bank, 21 N. Y. 49o (i86o); Smith, J.
in Mitchell v. Smith, 4 Yeates 84, 86 (Pa. 1804).
4 Harris v. Runnels, 12 How. (U. S.) 79 (I85I).
$Mitchell v. Smith, i Binn. iio (Pa. 1804);. The Corn. v. The Commissioners of Philadelphia County, 2 S. & R. 193 (Pa. 1816); Eberman v. Reitzel,
i W. & S. 18I (Pa. 1841); Bowman v. The Cecil Bank, 3 Gr. 33 (Pa. 1859);
Fowler v. Scully,

72

Pa. 456 (1872); Holt v. Green, 73 Pa. 198 (1873); Peet v.

Knight, 2 Pa. C. C. 445 (1886); Howard v. Jacoby, 3 Pa. C. C. 436 (1887); The
Corn. v. The Ins. Co., 14 Pa. C. C. 438 (1894); White v. Buss, 3 Cush. 448 (Mass.
1849); Miller v. Post, I Allen 434 (Mass. 1861). See Bank of U. S. v. Owens,
2 Pet.(U.
S.) 527 (1829).
6

Condon v. Walker, i Yeates 483 (Pa. 1795); Maybin v. Coulon, 4 Yeates
(Pa. 1804); Johnson v. Kolb, 3 W. N. C. 273 (Pa. 1876); Com. v. The Ins.
Co., supra; Miller v. Post, supra.
Mitchell v Smith, i Binn. ilo (Pa. 1804); Columbia Bank & Bridge
Co. v. Haldeman, 7 W. & S. 233 (Pa. 1844); Holt v. Green, supra.
8Rahter v. National Bank, 92 Pa. 393 (i88o).
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that, in Pennsylvania, the refusal to apply principles of construction to a statute is limited to those cases where there is either an
express prohibition, or where particular acts are required to be
done, or to be done in a certain way, and that in other cases the
courts have adopted the principle of construing the entire statute.
On the other hand, if there is a prohibition, the nature or even the
non-existence of a penalty would appear to be unimportant, inasmuch as the contract is declared to be illegal because it involves
an unlawful act, and the unlawfulness of the act is based upon and
derived wholly from the prohibition. 9 Where there is a prohibition,
no distinction is taken between those cases where the act is merely
malum prohibitum and those where it is malum in se. 1 In an
early case" it was said that, where the act was tnalum prohibitum
only, the plaintiff might recover unless the contract was directly
founded upon the illegal act; but this distinction has been expressly
repudiated and no longer is recognized in Pennsylvania. 2 While
there are no express statements on the subject, it would seem
proper that where principles of construction are to be applied to
determine the validity of a contract, the distinction between an
act malum prohibitum and an act malum in se should be taken
into consideration as one of the factors indicative of the legislative
purpose.
The courts of Pennsylvania have repeatedly recognized the
fact that the rule adopted by them leads to results, in some cases,
which are not only unjust but contrary to good morals. Their
answer to this objection, however, has been that the defense is
allowed not for the sake of the defendant but for the law itself."3
In several cases 4 recently decided in one of the Courts of Common
Pleas, the rigor with which the rule has been applied is well illustrated. These cases hold that a person or persons doing business
under an assumed or fictitious name, without having filed the
certificate required by the Act of June 28, 1917, P. L. 645," canThe Sussex Peerage, ii Cl. & F. 85, 148-9 (Eng. 1844).
10 Eberman v. Reitzel, supra; Columbia Bank & Bridge Co. v. Haldeman,
supra; Holt v. Green, supra.
"Swan v. Scott, II S. & R. 155, 164 (Pa., 1824). See Faikney v. Reynous, 4 Burr. 2o69 (Eng. 1767).
12 Columbia Bank & Bridge Co. v. Haldeman, supra, at p. 235. See
Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. &Ald. 179 (Eng. 1819).
"Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson, Cowp. 341, 343 (Eng. 1775);
Yeates, J. in Mitchell v. Smith, i Binn. 110, 121 (Pa., i8o4); Fowler v. Scully,
supra; Swing v. Munson, 191 Pa. 582, 588 (1899); Chicago Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v.
Myton, 24 Pa. Sup. Ct. 16, 20 (1903).
14Sykes Department Store v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 33 York
75 (Pa. i919); Codorus Planing Mill Co. v. Horn, 33 York 133 (Pa. i919).
15The Act provides that no individual or individuals shall carry on or
conduct a business, within the State, under an assumed or fictitious name, without having first filed, with the proper authorities, a certificate setting forth the
names of the persons owning, or interested in, the business, and the assumed
name under which they intend to carry it on. 'Failure to comply is made a
misdemeanor and is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.
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not recover under a contract made in furtherance of or in the

conduct of such business. In the one case, the action was brought
to recover for labor and materials furnished the defendant in the
course of the business; and in the other, it was sought to recover
for an alleged breach of contract for the carriage of goods to be
used in the business. They are the first reported cases arising
under the Act; and, while they present nothing new, either in the
principle or its application, they illustrate all the elements of the
rule as it is applied by the Pennsylvania courts.
The rule is applicable in every case where the plaintiff requires the aid of the illegal transaction to establish his case. It
is not necessary that the consideration of the contract itself should
be the prohibited act. It is sufficient if the consideration is in
aid or encouragement of it.16 Nor is it necessary that17the illegality
of the transaction should be apparent on the record.
While the results in individual cases may appear to be harsh,
it is submitted that the rule applied in these cases is sound in
principle. Where the legislature has seen fit to declare an act
illegal, it would seem to be foreign to the true purpose of statutory
construction to enter into a further investigation of the scope of
the act, especially as to a matter which is really collateral.u In
cases where a transaction has been declared illegal in unambiguous
language, it is difficult to see why the intention of the law-making
body is not sufficiently clear to render construction unnecessary.
Furthermore, the use of rules of construction in such cases would
tend to obscure that which before had been clear and obvious.
It is probable that the courts which have adopted the principle of
construction have been influenced by the opportunity which it
affords for the amelioration of the harsh effect of some statutes,
rather than that they have been actuated by the belief that the
doctrine was preferable in principle to the other.19 For the courts
to give a legal remedy for that which is itself illegal involves an
inconsistency which is difficult to support.20 "Courts of justice
sit to carry into execution dispassionately the general will of the
community disclosed by the laws. It would seem a solecism in
jurisprudence that a contract which necessarily leads to defeat
the provisions of an act of the legislature, of the highest public
concernment, should receive judicial sanction and support."21
R. J. B.
16 Condon v. Walker, supra; Swan v. Scott, supra; Badgley v. Beale, 3
Watts 263 (Pa., i834); Columbia Bank & Bridge Co. v. Haldeman, supra;
Thomas v. Brady, io Pa. 164, 170 (i848); Scott v. Duffy, 14 Pa. z8, 20 (1849);
Evans v. Dravo, 24 Pa. 62, 65 (1854); Toler v. Armstrong, supra; Spurgeon v.
McElwain, 6 Ohio 442 (1834); Gravier v. Carraby, 17 La. (0. S.) 1i8 (1841).
7Holt v. Green, supra;the opinion of the lower court in Chicago Bldg. &
Mfg. Co. v. Myton, reported in 24 Pa. Super. Ct. i6,20 (19o3); Melchoirv. McWis. 252 (1872).
Carty, 3.1
18Cannan v. Bryce, supra.
19Comstock, J. in The Oneida Bank v. The Ontario Bank, 21 N. Y. App.
490, 495 (I86O).
20 Bank
21

of U. S. v. Owens, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 527, 539 (1829).
Yeates, J. in Mitchell v. Smith, i Bin. i1o, 1i9 (Pa., 184).

NOTES
IN

THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ATTORNEY'S LIEN LAW
PENNSYLVANA.-The law has made great progress in protecting

members of the bar since Blackstone wrote that "a counsel can
maintain no action for his fees, which are given not as locatio vel
conductio, but as quiddam honorarium;not as a salary or hire, but

as a mere gratuity, which a counsellor cannot demand without
doing wrong to his reputation."' Although barristers still suffer
this restriction in England,2 solicitors may now recover their fees
when taxed by the court.3 The members of the bars of the various
jurisdictions in the United States have been fortunate in that this
civil law principle has never become a part of the common law
of any of the states. It is true that in the case of Mooney v.
Lloyd,4 decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1819,
Chief Justice Tilghman refused to allow an attorney to maintain
an action for fees, declaring that "without doubt, no such action
lies at common law." But eleven years later, that court abandoned such a doctrine in a case, 5 the report of which concludes
with the significant statement that "Gibson, C. J., expressed his
satisfaction in overruling the case of Mooney v. Lloyd." In
New York, too, as late as 1840, it was argued that "at common
law a counselor cannot maintain an action for his fees"; that "such
is undeniably the law of England, and in this state it has not been
held otherwise, the question never having been directly brought
up for adjudication." The New York court, however, had no
difficulty in holding otherwise, and allowed .the action.6 And7
such is the uniformly recognized law in all of the United States.
In addition to the right to bring an action of debt for the
amount of his costs, an attorney has the right to retain the property that has come into his hands in the course of his employment.
He has a right to retain as well as a right to sue-a jus in rem as
well as a jus in personam. This is a principle of the common law,
and is not derived from any statutes; although, according to Lord
St. Leonards, s it is a comparatively modem development. It is
necessary to ascertain on what property this right of lien may be
exercised.
All authorities are agreed that papers and deeds, or funds,
or other property of the client which may be in the hands of the
attorney, are subject to this lien. It is known as a passive lien
if the property of the client so held by the attorney is in the form
LBlackstone:

Commentaries, Book III, p.

27.

2
Kennedy v. Broun, I3 C. B. (N. S.) 677 (Eng. 1863).
3
Solicitor's Remuneration Act of 1881, Annual Practice, Part IV, Division 3.
n 5 S.& R. 412
(Pa. x819).
5Gray v. Brackenridge, 2 P. & W. 75 (Pa. 183o).
6Stevens v. Adams, 23 Wendell 57 (N. Y. 1840); affirmed, sub nom.
Adams7 v. Stevens, 26 Wendell 451 (N. Y. 1841).
Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548 (1876); Stevens v. Monges, i Harrington 127 (Del. 1832); Clay v;.
Moulton, 70 Me. 315 (1879).
$ Blunden v. Desart, 2 Drury & Warren 4o5, 427 (Eng. 1842).
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of documents. In such case, the attorney cannot actually realize
on his client's papers by selling them, but can only retain them
until his claim is satisfied. 9 On the other hand, if the property
his lien by
consists of funds, the attorney can at once exercise
deducting the amount of his claim from them. 10 This is known
as an active lien. Even in Pennsylvania, where an attorney's lien
upon moneys collected is hardly recognized under that name, but
is called rather a right of defalcation,'I a court of equity will protect an attorney who is entitled to a compensation out of a fund
within its control." This was the extent of the attorney's lien
at common law.
In 186o, the Solicitor's Act was passed in England; and by
its 28th Section it was provided that where a solicitor is employed
to prosecute or defend an action or other proceeding in any court
of justice, it shall be lawful for the court to give him a charge
upon the property, which shall have been recovered or preserved
through his instrumentality, for his costs. Subsequently, in many
jurisdictions of the United States, the client's cause of action has
been subjected to this so-called "charging lien" by acts of legislature.18
Falling in line with this tendency of the times, the legislature
of Pennsylvania passed an act 4 in 1915, in substance the same
as those of the other states. It provided that "from the commencement of any action or proceeding, either at law, in equity, or
or the filing of any counter-claim or any
otherwise .......
pleading, the attorney who appears of record for a party therein
shall have a lien for his compensation for his services upon his
client's cause of action, claim, or counterclaim, which shall attach
to any award, order, report, decision, compromise, settlement,
verdict, or judgment in the client's favor, and the proceeds thereof
in whosesoever hands they may come, etc.;" and that "the court
in which the cause is brought shall, on the petition of the client
or attorney, have jurisdiction to determine and enforce the lien."
The recent case of Laplacca v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co.'s put
the statute to the test; and the supreme court of the state held
(io9).

9 Young v. English, 7 Beavan io (Eng. 1843); in re Gillaspie, 19o Fed. 88

Hole, r Douglas 237 (Eng. 1779); in re Paschal, 77 U. S. 483
v10Welshv.
(x870); Dowling v. Eggeman, 47 Mich. 17I, ioN. W. 187 (i88I).
" Dubois' Appeal, 38 Pa. 231 (18ft).
2McKelvy's Appeal, io8 Pa. 615 (1885); Freeman v. Shreve, 86 Pa. 135
(1878).
1 Johnson v. McCurry, io2 Ga. 471, 31 S. E. 88 (1897); Hubbard v. Ellithorpe, 135 Ia. 259, 112 N. W. 796 (1907); Kansas-Pacific R. R. v. Thacher,
17 Kan. 92 (1876); McIntosh v. Bach, no Ky. 701, 62 S. W. 515 (i9oi); North-

rup v. Hayward, 102 Minn. 3o7, 113 N. W. 701 (i9o7); O'Connor v. St. Louis
Transit Co., x98 Mo. 622, 97 S. W. 150 (i9o6); Lewis v. Omaha St. Rwy. Co.,
114 N. W. 281 (Neb. 1907); Fischer-Hansen v. Brooklyn Heights Co., 173 N. Y.
492,-66 N. E. 395 (1903); Sidoway v. Jones, 125 Tenn. 322, 143 S. W. 893 (911);
Comp. Laws of Utah, Sec. 135; McRea v. Warehime, 49 Wash. 194, 94 Pac. 924

0908S).
"
"4Act of May 6, I915, P. L. 261.
15265 Pa. 304 (1919); affirming 68 Pa. Super. Ct. 208 (1916).
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that, in enacting it, the legislature had overstepped the barrier
raised by Article III, Section 7, of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
which declares: "The General Assembly shall not pass any local
or special law authorizing the creation, extension, or impairing of
liens . . . or providing or changing methods for the collection
of debts." It will be noticed that all legislation relating to the
creating of liens, or providing new methods for the collection
of debts, is not prohibited by the Constitution, but such only
as comes within the definition of local or special laws. The act
applies generally to the entire state and hence is not local. But
the court considers that a statute affecting only lawyers and extending to them rights and privileges in the collection of their fees,
not accorded to members of other professions, is special legislation,
and therefore unconstitutional.
It is interesting to note that when a similar statute was held
constitutional in spite of a like provision in the Missouri Constitution, the supreme court 16 of that state relied on a Pennsylvania
decision for its conception of a special law. "It is clearly not
special legislation," so runs the opinion, "on the ground that
it simply applies to attorneys-at-law. The distinction between
general and special laws has been very clearly drawn by numerous
cases in this state. The rule upon this subject as announced by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Wheeler v. Philadelphia,
77 Pa. 338, has repeatedly met the approval of this court. It is
there held that 'a statute which relates to persons or things as
a class is a general law, while a statute which relates to particular
persons or things of a class is special."'
However, those states which do not have prohibitions in their
constitutions against special laws, realize that the attorney's lien
acts are such; but, being free from constitutional restraint, they
uphold and approve them. "Those who follow the legal profession
constitute a class," says the leading Illinois case, 17 "and laws
may be passed applicable only to members of a class where the
classification rests upon.some disability, attribute, or classification
marking them as proper objects for the operation of such special
legislation, in any case wherein such local or special legislation is
not expressly forbidden by the constitution." Pennsylvania is one.
case where it is so expressly forbidden by the Constitution.
It is true that the attitude of the Pennsylvania courts has
always been unfavorable to acts of the legislature creating new
liens or extending old ones for the benefit of particular professions
or trades;18 and in spite of the broad rule laid down in Wheeler v.
Philadelphia'9and relied on by the Missouri courts, it has recog6
O'Connor v. St. Louis Transit Co., supra.
77 Standidge v. Chicago Rwy. Co., 254 Ill.
524, 98 N. E. 963 (1912).
28Sauer v. Doerfer, 22 Pa. Dist. 39 (1912), architects;Michaels v. Cunningham,

20

Pa. Dist. io (i9io), boarding-housekeepers' lien on salaries; Strine v.

Foltz, 113 Pa. 349 (1886), sheriffs and prothonotaries;Vulcanite Cement Co. v.
Allson, 220 Pa. 382 (igo8), mechanics' lien on moneys in hands of third party.
1 77 Pa. 338 (1875).
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nized special laws for a certain class only where the classification
was required by urgent public necessity. 20 However, without
Article III, Section 7, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Attorney's Lien Act of 1915 would undoubtedly be enforceable. Without
that constitutional prohibition, the members of the Pennsylvania
bar would be in the same favorable position as are the lawyers in
many of the United States, and as are the solicitors in England.
Just as changing conditions brought about a departure from
the old honorarium system, just as counsel's right of action for his
fee was found to be a necessary substitute for the political prestige
which was formerly his only reward, so today the legislatures of
the country are realizing the necessity of giving the lawyer a safeguard such as the ordinary business .man has. A lender can demand an indorser on a note; a builder can demand a surety on the
contractor's bond; a manufacturer can sell his product on a bailment lease and yet retain title to it. But a lawyer, in practice,
cannot obtain any guarantee for his fees. Yet, because of the
nature of his profession, he must often accept the case of a client
whom he knows to be poor or irresponsible, and of whose honesty
he has no proof. If such a client pockets the fruits of the litigation, a suit and judgment against him for fees would be a farce.
And such a contingency is far from unlikely, in these days of claim
departments and indemnity companies, where one of the chief
inducements for settlement is the client's knowledge that he can
collect all the money, and neglect to pay the attorney whom he
has retained and through whose efforts the case has been brought
up to the point of settlement.
Looking to the ultimate result, it will also be seen that it is
to the client's interest that there should be an enforceable attorney's
lien law. For one who has a grievance, be it great or small, will
the more readily find a lawyer, a better lawyer, and one who will
devote his best efforts to the case, if there is the certainty that the
client will not reap all the benefits and the attorney have naught
but the labor. However, under the present constitution of Pennsylvania, an attorney's lien law is impossible. The mistake, if it
be such, can only be corrected by constitutional amendment or
revision.
A.L.
RIGHT OF THE STATE TO ALTER CONTRACT OR FRANCHISE

RATES OF PUBLIC UTILITIEs.-The extent to which agreements as
to rates of service contained in contracts between public service
companies and the consumer, or in franchises granted by municipal
or state governments, are binding, is a question of vital importance
to public utility companies all over the country. Rates which
originally yielded a return commensurate with the risk involved
in such undertakings, the capital invested therein, and the service
2
QCommonwealth v. Hanley, 15 Pa. Super. Ct. 271 (igoo), undertakers;
Commonwealth v. Jones, 4 Pa. Super. Ct. 362 (1897), Miners.
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performed by the utility are, in many cases, no longer sufficient
to pay ordinary operating expenses and fixed charges. This has
been brought about by conditions over which the utility has no
control, and is due chiefly to the greatly increased cost of labor
and materials in the years during and since the war. The public
service company, where long term contracts or franchise agreements are held binding, is unable to increase its revenue in order
to keep pace with increased and increasing costs of operation.
State utility commissions, legislatures, and even courts have not
been slow to realize this condition; and in general they have sought
to give the necessary relief.
This tendency is perceptible in two cases recently decidedone, Borough of Wilkinsburg v. Pubic Service Commission,' by
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, and the other, Dubuque Electric Company v. City of Dubuque, Iowa,2 by the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. In the Pennsylvania case, the court decided that the state Public Service
Commission had power to order a change in rates fixed in a "consent ' 13 ordinance. In reaching this conclusion, the court construed
as a general reservation of the police power a provision of the state
constitution that "the exercise of the police power of the State
shall never be abridged or so construed as to permit corporations
to conduct their business in such manner as to infringe the 'equal
' 4
rights of individuals or the general well-being of the State,"
though it was argued that the section quoted "merely put a restriction on the usurpation of powers by corporations." Said
the court: "The existence of the police power is assumed; its
'exercise' shall not be abridged or so construed as to infringe the
general well-being of the State ........
It seems that the
framers of the Constitution had in mind that whatever other provisions there might be in the instrument, the operations of corporations should not be allowed to impair the sovereignty of the
state, so as to deprive the legislature of remedying such evils as
might arise, and that when such a situation presented itself as
we are now considering, the courts might be entirely untrammelled
in preserving the rights of the State, and furthering its welfare." 5
'72

Pa. Super. Ct. 423 (1919).

226o

Fed. 353 (1919).

3Article XVII, Sec. 9, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania provides that
"No street passenger railway shall be constructed within the limits of any city,
borough, or township, without the consent of its local authorities." This has
been construed as giving the local authorities absolute discretion and exclusive
power to fix the conditions upon which they will consent to the construction
of a street passenger railway upon the local highways, including the power to
contract as to rates, free from legislative interference. Allegheny v. Millville
Railway Company, 159 Pa. 41i; 28 Atl. 202 (1893); Plymouth Twp. v. The
Railway, 168 Pa. 181; 32 Atl. i9 (1895).
4 Constitution of Pennsylvania, Article XVI, Sec. 3.
d Cf. Foltz v. Public Service Commission, 73 Pa. Super. Ct. 24 (919),
decided the same day, but reported since the above note was written, in which
a like conclusion was reached by the same court, but on the ground that the
word "corporation" as used in Article XVI, Sec. 3, must be construed to mean
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In the other case, it was held that the provisions of a franchise
which required a street railway company to sell at reduced rates
workingmen's tickets, good only at certain hours of the day, was
not enforceable against the company after passage by the state
legislature of an act 6 prohibiting common carriers, in the sale of
tickets for transportation at reduced rates to discriminate between
persons purchasing the same. The contention of the municipalities
in these cases was that if the state laws involved were construed
as permitting the change in rates, they would impair the obliga-7
tion of the contract between them and the utility concerned.
In such cases it is necessary for the courts, where they find that a
binding contract exists, to determine what is its obligation and
if that obligation is impaired by subsequent legislation.8 It is
only under the last of these considerations that a constitutional
question is raised.
That the Constitutional prohibition on state laws impairing
the obligation of contracts does not restrict the power of the state
to protect the public health, morals or safety-generally called
the "police power"--is well settled. 9 This is a power inherent in
sovereignty and cannot be abridged nor divested by the state
legislature even by express grant, and all contract' and property
rights are held subject to its exercise.1
The rates for service
charged by persons or corporations engaged in a business affected
with a public interest have long been considered to have such
an important bearing upon and close connection .with the public
welfare generally as to justify regulation -thereof by the state
legislature under its police power.1 ' It follows that agreements
as to rates, whether made between the utility and individuals,
cities, or the state are equally subject to a reserved power in the
state legislature to enact laws under which such charges may be
regulated, and that no attempt of the legislature to restrict this
power should be valid. But the cases seem to draw a distinction
between grants of privileges injurious to the public safety, morals
municipal as well as private corporations. Note, however, that the title of
this article of the Constitution is "Private Corporations"; section 8 thereof,
intended to be broader, specifically includes municipal corporations.
6Acts 32nd G. A., Ch. 112; Supplement, Code of Iowa, 1913, Secs. 2157f2157j. 7

Article I, Sec. IO, Par. i of the Constitution of the United States provides inter alia that "No state shall . . . pass any .
.
law impairing
the obligation of contracts."
8 Detroit United Railway v. Michigan, 242 U. S. 238 (r916).
9 New Orleans Water Works Company v. Rivers, II5 U. S. 674 (1885);
Manigault
v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473 (i9o5).
10
Boston Beer Company v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25 (1877); Atlantic
Coast Line v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 558 (1913) and cases there cited.
n Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876); Milwaukee Electric Company v.
Railroad Commission, 238 U. S. 174 (1915); Leiper v. Baltimore & P. R. R.
Company, 262 Pa. 328; 1o5 Atl. 551 (1918); Union Dry Goods Company v.
Georgia Public Service Company, 248 U. S. 372 (1919).

NOTES

or health, and those which are merely a compensation for the performance of a public service, among which is the right to fix rates
of service.12 In the latter class of case, it is held that the legislature may divest itself of power to change the terms of the grant,
when it clearly appears that it positively and intentionally contemplated this result. 13 The power to make binding rate agreements, conclusive on the state, may also be delegated to municipalities under the same condition." But in the majority of cases,
some clause is found in the state constitution which can be construed as a limitation on the power of the legislature to divest
itself of the right to regulate rates so that an attempt to do so
will be invalid;15 or a reservation of this power to the state is found
in the grant itself. So practically, the cases are few in which
the state may not by a proper exercise of its authority, remedy
any injustices or inequalities resulting from rates fixed by contract
or franchise.
In the Dubuque case it might well have been argued, though
the point seems not to have been raised, that the Iowa statute
was not designed to annul franchise agreements of the kind involved in that case. In its decision, the Circuit Court of Appeals
professed to follow the Supreme Court of the United States in
its recent decision in the case of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas
Company,' 6 in which the validity of an order of the state Corporation Commission changing franchise rates was questioned by
the city. The city formerly having the power to regulate such
rates, and the state having attempted to divest it of that power
and bestow it on another agency, "the whole controversy is as
to which of two existing agencies or arms of the state government
is authorized to exercise in the public interest a particular power,
obviously governmental, subject to which the franchise was
granted."17 This was conceived to *be only a question of local
law, as to which the decision of the supreme court of the state was
final. In the Dubuque case the statute did not in words make
12Bessemer v. Bessemer City Water Works, 152 Ala. 391; 44 So. 663
(1907).

1 Pingree v. Michigan Central Railroad Company, ii8 Mich. 314; 76
N. W. 635 (1898).

14Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Commission, 98 Ohio St. 320, 121 N. E.
688 (1918); Virginia-Western Power Company v. Commonwealth, 99 S. E.
.723 (Va. i919); Detroit United Railway v. Michigan, 242 U. S. 238 (x918).
Or such as that relied on in the Willdnsburg Borough Case, supra. In
Missouri a provision of the state constitution forbidding construction of street
railways without the consent of the local authorities was held merely to give
the municipalities the right to make agreements as to rates of fare, which agreements are nevertheless subject to the police power of the state and must give
way to the orders of the public service commission; no restrictive clause of the
constitution like that in the Pennsylvania Constitution relied on in the Wilkinsburg Case was considered necessary. St. Louis v. Public Service Commission,
276 Mo. 509; 207 S.W. 799 (1918).
18 250 U. S.394 (1919).
17 Id., at 397.
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invalid existing contracts for the sale of tickets at reduced rates,
but merely provided that when tickets were so sold no discrimination should be made between persons entitled to purchase them.
It has been held that contracts or franchise agreements as to rates
of service are not invalidated by the mere passage of laws requiring that rates be reasonable, prohibiting discriminations, and
creating public service commissions with which schedules of rates
must be filed;" the statute must clearly show the intention of the
legislature that such rates should no longer be binding on the
utility."9 That the court considered this enactment of the Iowa
legislature an abrogation of so much of the franchise contract as
bound the company to sell tickets at a reduction to certain classes
of the city's inhabitants for use only at certain hours of the day,
rather than an extension of the obligations of the company, seems
clearly an indication of judicial policy.
This inclination of the courts to narrow the efficacy of franchise
agreements and contracts as to rates, and to resolve- all doubts in
favor of the power of the state to regulate such matters, is a salutary one. The power to regulate rates in the public interest should
be held as inviolable as is the power to safeguard public health,
safety and morals. The state, while requiring the faithful performance of the duties assumed by public service companies,
should be able to guarantee them a fair and reasonable return
on their investment, and at the same time to protect the people
of the state from possible exploitation by the utilities should conditions be reversed.
0. P. M.
Tim RIGHT OF PRivAcy.-The recent decision in the case
of Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,' which fixes within new2
bounds the right of privacy as recognized by a New York statute,
is but another illustration of the increasing prominence and importance which this right, recognized only within the last decade,
is assuming in our law. In this case the plaintiff sought to enjoin
defendant film company from presenting her picture in a motion
picture film depicting current events, the picture, having been
ISManitowoc v. Manitowoc Traction Company, 145 Wis. 13; 129 N. W.
(1911); Sultan R. & Timber Company v. Great Northern R. Company,
58 Wash. 604; io9 Pac. 320 (19io); Belfast v. Belfast Water Company, 98 Atl.
738 (Me. 1916), a case substantially similar to the Dubuque case, except that
after a certain number of years free service was to be rendered the city, instead
of service at reduced rates to a portion of its citizens. In Quinby v. Public
Service Commission, 223 N. Y. 244; ii9 N. E. 433 (1918), the public service
commission was held not to have jurisdiction to alter rates fixed by the city,
because the court failed to find in the statute creating the commission a word
which would disclose an intent to deal with rates fixed by agreement with local
authorities.
19Denver Company v. Englewood, 62 Colo. 229; 161 Pac. i5i (1916);
State ex rel. City of Billings v. Billings Gas Company, 55 Mont. 202; 173 Pac.
799 (2918).
1178 N. Y. S. 752 (1919).
2Civil Rights Law (Consol. Laws,-c. 6), Sec. So,& 5.
925
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obtained, without her consent, while plaintiff was actively engaged
in the solution of a notorious murder mystery. The remedy was
demanded under a statute which prohibits the use of a person's
name or picture without their written consent "for advertising
purposes or for the purposes of trade," and provides a remedy by
injunction, The court held that this case did not come within
the prohibition of the statute, since this was analagous to publication in a newspaper, it having already been decided in a number of cases that publication in a newspaper, when not part of
an advertisement, did not come within the meaning of the statute.3
Formal expression of the nature and necessity for a right of
privacy was first made in a leading article in the Harvard Law
Review (I89o);4 and it may be said that the numerous cases in
which this right of privacy has been considered since that article
appeared, have added nothing to the admirable analysis contained
therein. It states that since "instantaneous photography and
newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private
and domestic life . . . there has been a feeling that the law
must afford some remedy for the unauthorized circulation of
portraits of private persons.",, A few years following the publication of this article, the doctrine was approved in a dictum by
the U. S. Circuit Court (Mass.), to the effect that "a private individual should be protected against the publication of any portraiture of himself." 6 But when the Michigan court was asked to
prevent the use of the picture of a plaintiff's deceased husband on
a cigar label, it refused any remedy, and added that the husband
himself would be remediless, were he alive.7 In 19o2, the question
came directly before the New York courts when a young lady
sought an injunction and damages against defendant company
who were using her picture, without her consent, in a flour advertisement. The court refused both.s
The first decision in which the right of privacy was expressly
recognized appeared in 1905, when the Georgia court, in Pavesich
v. New England Life Ins. Co., 9 allowed a plaintiff to recover damages against defendant company for the unauthorized use of
plaintiff's portrait in a life insurance advertisement. In a lengthy
discussion of the subject the court said that this right has its
3 Jeffries v. The New York Evening Journal, 67 Misc. 570, 124 N. Y. S.
78o (191o); Colyer v. Fox Publishing Co., 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N. Y. S. 999
(1914)44 Harvard Law Review 193 (189o).

For other discussions see: 36 American Law Register 745 (1897); 55 Central Law Journal 123 (1902); 57 Central
Law Journal 361 (19o3).
5 supra, p. 195.
67 Corliss v. Walker, 64 Fed. 282 (1894).
Atkinson v. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, So N. W. 285 (899).
8 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442
(19o2). The N. Y. statute, supra, was enacted shortly after this decision.
9122 Ga. 19o, 5o S. E. 68 (19o5).
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foundation in the instincts of nature, that everyone is entitled
to live a private life without coming before the public, and that
although there be no precedent in which this right is recognized,
the common law will judge according to the law of nature and the
public good.
Since the year in which the leading case of Pavesic v. New
England Life Ins. Co. was decided, the right of privacy has been
recognized in various jurisdictions. The New Jersey court granted
an injunction to restrain the unauthorized use of a plaintiff's
picture in medicine advertisements,", and in a similar case the
Kentucky court said, "a person is entitled to the right of privacy
as to his picture."' " It has been held by the Missouri court that
damages may be obtained for violation of the right of privacy
in a case in which the plaintiff's picture was used in an advertisement; and the court added by way of dictum that it was a violation of a property right, and that an injunction would be granted
to prevent the publication." In.a very recent case in Kansas it
was held that the exhibition in a moving picture theatre of the
photograph of a plaintiff, taken without her consent, and for the
purpose of advertising defendant's business, is a violation of the
right of privacy and entities her to recover without proof of special
damage. 13 On the other hand, it has been held in a Rhode Island
case that a person has no right of privacy for the invasion of which
an action for damages will lie at common law. 14
At this time it seems plain that the weight and trend of
authority is in favor of a right of privacy. But there is still much
doubt as to the nature of this right. Is it only a personal right for
the violation of which damages may be recovered? Or is it a
property right against the infringement of which an injunction
can be obtained? What is the relation of this right to the doctrine
of the freedom of the press?"r These are all questions in regard
to which it is impossible at the present time to draw any conclusion
supported by the authority of decided cases.
It is in the light of the relation of the right of privacy to
the freedom of the press that the case of Hunmiston v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co.16 is of particular interest. It will be noted that
the provision of the New York statute referred to above, is broad
enough to include all the cases actually decided on the basis of
a right of privacy, since they all involved its violation for the
10Edison v. Edison Polyform & Manuf. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 At"
392 (1907).
39Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, x34 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364 (i9o9).
2Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. io76 (i9i).
"Kunz
v. Allen & Bayne, io2 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532 (I918).
4

Henry v. Webb, 3o R. I. 13, 73 Atl. 97 (,909).
15There is a dictum in the Pavesich case, supra, p. 204, to this effect:
"The right of privacy is unquestionably limited by the right to speak and print.
One may be used as a check upon the other; but neither can be lawfully used for
the other's
destruction."
16 supra.
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purpose of trade or advertisement. The decision of the New York
court, therefore, in subordinating the right of privacy to the doctrine of the freedom of the press, and extending this doctrine to
include motion pictures of the character described, is significant.
It has been held by the Washington court that the publication,
in a newspaper, of the photograph of a young girl, in connection
with an article stating that her father was to be arrested, was not
actionable by the girl. 17 But in Washington the right of privacy
has not been before the courts in any reported case; so it cannot
be determined whether this decision raises the freedom of the press
above the right of privacy, or repudiates the right entirely. It is conceded in all comment upon the subject, that "the
right of privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which
is of public or general interest";" and so, on this9 ground, the decision in Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.1 seems to be in
conformity with the now existing common law conception of
the right of privacy.
S.B.R.
JUDIcIAL RATE FixNG.--That the fixing of rates and charges
of public utilities is a legislative function is so well accepted law
that it may no longer be questioned. This has been enunciated
by countless decisions throughout the United States.' This principle, however, is limited in the decisions by the requirement that
any legislative action or regulation by a utility as to rates must be
subject to judicial review as regards its compliance with constitutional limitations, such as the property deprivation clauses in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, or law imposed limitations,
such as the reasonable rate doctrine. Further in all these decisions
the question has always been whether a rate, actually in effect,
fixed by the legislature or by the utility, was unconstitutionally
low or unreasonably high. It seems that no court, prior to a
recent decision in New York,2 has had occasion to pass directly
upon an application to it to fix a reasonable rate in advance as
incidental relief from a confiscatory statute. In the first case2
where this problem has arisen, the oft-expressed limitation of the
judicial function is resolutely upheld. The decision was reached,
moreover, in spite of the fact that the court was thereby unable
to afford a utility suffering from a.n admitted hardship any adequate relief.
17 Hillman v. Starr Pub. Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594 (1911).
184 Harvard Law Review 214.

19supra.

' Western Union Tel. Co. v. Myatt, 98 Fed. 335 (1899); Minnesota Rate
Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1912); Water Works v. San Francisco, 82 Cal. 286, 22
Pac. 9io
2 (I89O).
Bronx Gas & E. Co. v. Public Service Commission, lO8 Misc. Rep. 204,
178 N. Y. S. 218 (1919).
3 In an extended review of the cases involving rates no flat decision was
found involving this point. Many in dicta laid down the rule as to the separation of the judicial and legislative function. Further no mention of a decision
on this point was to be found in Mr. Bruce Wyman's exhaustive treatise on
Public Service Companies, §§14oo-14o6.
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The Bronx Gas and Electric Company, finding that the
greatly enhanced operating costs of post-bellum conditions necessitated an increase in revenue, petitioned the Public Service Commission for permission to fix a new schedule of charges, raising
the unit charge from one dollar per thousand cubic feet of gas to
one dollar and fifty cents. This petition was dismissed on the
ground that the commission had no power to authorize charges
greater than one dollar per thousand. 4 Thereafter, the court of
last resort of the state of New York decided, in a similar case,
that the commission had no power to deal with rates above statutory maximums, even when such statutes had been adjudged
confiscatory and unconstitutional. The gas company then filed
a new schedule of charges, duly publishing it in compliance with
statutory requirements.6 Thereafter, various consumers instituted
proceedings against the gas company before the Public Service
Commission to procure a reduction of the rates so filed. Under
these circumstances the gas company brought a bill for an injunction to restrain the Public Service Commission, certain public
officials, and all its consumers from interfering with the gas company in the collection of a price of one dollar and fifty cents or
such other price as the court might deem reasonable. In addition
the company prayed that certain price-fixing statutes be declared
confiscatory and unconstitutional. The court granted an injunction pendente lite restraining the enforcement of these statutes,
but flatly refused to consider the reasonableness of the rate proposed or to fix a reasonable rate. This decision was reached in
spite of the insistence of the gas company that such refusal would
leave it without any recourse for relief to any governmental agency,
except a legislature not in session. Under similar circumstances,
such a condition had been found to result by Mr. ex-Justice Hughes,
while sitting as referee. 7
The refusal of the court itself to fix a rate seems thoroughly
in accord with the trend of all prior adjudications. Such a function is exclusively a legislative one.8 Nevertheless, it seems that
the court could very well have considered the rate proposed by
the gas company and reached a conclusion as to its reasonableness. Such a decision would not have been rate fixing by the
courts but, on the contrary, would have been merely an adjudication, in advance, of a problem that would certainly be brought
up and, in fact, of one that was already the subject of litigation.
4Laws N. Y. 19o6, c. 125, fixing $i.oo per thousand cubic feet as the maximum charge for gas; Consol. Laws N. Y., c. 48, Art. 4, §72, granting the Public
Service Commission certain general powers and the specific power to " . . .
within lawful limits

. . . fix maximum price of gas

. . . not exceeding

that fixed
by statute."
5
People ex rel Municipal Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 224
N. Y. 156, 12o N. E. 132 (1918).
4, §66, sub-sect. 12.
76 Consol. Laws N. Y., c. 48, Art.
Brooklyn Borough Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 17 State
Dept. Rep. 81 (N. Y. 1918).
8Note 18 L. R. A. N. S. 773; note L. R. A. 1915 C. 261.
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Such a decision would have been in the nature of a Bill of Peace
to avoid a multiplicity of actions already pending, where only a
single question was raised and all the parties involved were in
privity of interest. 9 It would be a highly appropriate method of
avoiding a multiplicity of separate actions at law, and a sound
modern mode of settling the rights of the parties, until such time
as the legislature should have straightened out the difficulty by
repealing the restrictive rate statute and either given its commission full powers in the matter or prescribed a new legal maximum, constitutional in amount. The adoption of such a policy
by the court would have been thoroughly in accord with the policy
of the legislature in enacting Public, Service Commission Laws
for the purpose of preventing rate problems from coming into
judicial existence, rather than attempting to remedy them after
they have reached a critical stage through deferring action until
the last possible moment. Moreover, from a practical viewpoint,
it seems like rather loose reasoning, difficult to support, to hold
that it is improper for a court to determine, in a single equitable
action with all the interested parties in court, the reasonableness
of a rate, which has been proposed, filed, and advertised by a
utility before any serious damage arises, while it is one of the
venerable common law procedures for a court to pass upon the
reasonableness of a rate charged by a utility in multiple suits
by consumers to recover alleged excesses in charges. Further,
it is doubtful if the authorities really uphold any such general
limitation of the judicial function. In the language of Hook, J.,
in one of the leading cases on the topicio " . . . to prescribe
a tariff of rates and charges is a legislative function; to determine
whether existing or prescribed rates and charges are unreasonable
is a judicial function." It would seem that a rate in such condition as was the advanced schedule of the gas company in question
was a sufficiently existing rate to come within the wording of
such a decision as the above. The New York Court states:
the judicial power does not extend to the fixation of a rate, and
by whatever term this relief is denominated, it would ultimately
result in the determination of a court that the specific rate, the
interference with which is sought to be enjoined was a reasonable
rate.""' Is not such a determination, very distinctly, a judicial
question in many early and modem cases? 12

G.B.
9Montgomery Light Co. v. Charles et al. 258 Fed. 723 (i19i); 68 U. of P.

Law Rev. 167.
10Western Union Tel. Co. v. Myatt, 98 Fed. 335 (1899).
u io8 Misc. Rep. x82, 178 N. Y. S. 174 (1919).
2 For a number of pertinent discussions of war and post-war problems
of Public Utilities and Public Service Commissions see Lecture before Assoc.
of the Bar of the City of New York by George S. Coleman, March 29, 19i6;
lecture before Assoc. of the Bar of the city of New York by William D. Guthrie,
April 5, 1916. 23 Pa. Bar. Assoc. Reports 292 (1917); 43 Am. Bar. Assoc. Reports 554 (z918); 43 Am. Bar Assoc. Reports 567 (1918); 64 Univ. of Penna.
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